Dryden Flight Research Center
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# Dryden Plan (DPL)

# Code (J)

# Airfield and Aircraft Physical Security Plan

## AIRFIELD AND AIRCRAFT PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN
## APPROVAL SIGNATURES

This plan becomes approved on the date of the last signature.

Original signatures on file.

# CONTENTS

# 1.0 PURPOSE OF PLAN

The Airfield and Aircraft Physical Security Plan describes physical security requirements and individual responsibilities for safeguarding the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) airfield, aircraft and components at Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC), Dryden Aircraft Operations Facility (DAOF) and while deployed – stateside or overseas. Deployments are defined as cross-country flights, flights to airshows, and all operations conducted from airfields other than Edwards AFB or Palmdale Plant 42.

The aircraft commander is responsible for all aspects of security when the aircraft is located off station.

Nothing in this document prevents the aircraft commander from using any suitable airport in the event of an aircraft emergency, or as required by fuel, weather, or maintenance considerations.

# 2.0 SCOPE, APPLICABILITY, & WAIVER

## 2.1 Scope

This plan applies to NASA airfield, aircraft - including components, unmanned arial vehicles (UAV), unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and balloons.

## 2.2 Applicability

This plan applies to NASA - DFRC Organizations involved in flight activities and protection of resources.

## 2.3 Waiver

This plan may be waived by the DFRC Chief, Protective Services or the Center Director unless the waiver entails deviations from applicable NASA NPRs.

# 3.0 HOME STATION RESPONSIBILITIES

Code O, Director for Flight Operations, will appoint a Facility Security Manager (FSM) for each aviation facility (hangar) who will ensure all required security measures are implemented and any security concerns are addressed with the Chief, Protective Services (CPS).

## 3.1 Flight Line Access Control

All aviation facilities, aircraft parking areas, taxiways, ramps, pads and support equipment storage areas must have some form of entry control. Entry authorization can be controlled through manpower, procedural means, such as flight line badging, and mechanical, or electronic entry control systems.

Unescorted access to aviation facilities, aircraft, ramps, and taxiways can be authorized only after completion of an appropriate background investigation, issuance of appropriate photo-identification (ID) badge, and viewing of the Center Safety Briefing.

Foreign National contractor employees must be properly cleared in accordance with NPD 1371.5, Coordination and Authorization of Access by Foreign Nationals and Foreign Representatives to NASA, and escort requirements must be in accordance with NPR 1600.1, NASA Security Program Procedural Requirements.

Privately-owned vehicles are prohibited on the flight line or other areas where aircraft are parked, except when authorized in writing by the aviation facility FSM or Director for Flight Operations, and CPS. The approval letter must include name of the driver, his/her organization and phone number, and areas authorized to travel on the airfield. A copy of the approval letter must be prominately displayed in the vehicle.

Authorized vehicles on the flight line must be operated by personnel in possession of a current flight line driver's license.

## 3.2 Aircraft Security

When not in use, place aircraft and aircraft components, to include crewmember equipment at NASA aviation facilities, in the most secure location available on the Center.

When aircraft are not stored in secure structures and when operational requirements permit, keep aircraft adequately separated from each other to limit potential for multiple aircraft incidents but close enough for ease of monitoring. Keep aircraft away from the perimeter of the aircraft parking area to the maximum extent possible .

Unless otherwise approved by the Chief, Protective Services, aircraft parking and ramp areas to include runways, will be protected by a NASA standard perimeter security fence as described in NPR 1620.3, Physical Security Requirements for NASA Facilities and Property.

Aircraft parking areas must be illuminated at night sufficiently to allow physical security personnel to detect intruders.

Secure all auxiliary power units for starting aircraft, vehicle tugs, forklifts, aircraft boarding ladders, and other items that might be used to circumvent existing physical security measures during non-duty hours.

Protective Services' Security Officers will provide continuous roving surveillance of aircraft. Personnel working on or near aircraft may be considered equivalent to continuous surveillance provided appropriate emergency duress procedures are available. See Section 3.3.

Unidentified baggage, parcels, etc., must not be placed aboard aircraft until adequately screened and the owner is identified. The Aircraft Commander is responsible for screening all baggage. All unclaimed baggage etc., must be turned over to security personnel for appropriate disposition.

### 3.3 Emergency Actions / Notifications

Unauthorized aircraft movement must be stopped prior to exiting Dryden's controlled ramp and taxiways, if possible. Use vehicles to block taxiing of the aircraft. If the aircraft exits Dryden's controlled ramp, contact Edwards' Air Traffic Control Tower or Plant 42 Air Traffic Control Tower, as appropriate, and the Air Force Security Forces and alert them to the unauthorized movement. Request assistance preventing the aircraft from taking off.

Organizations that work on the DFRC controlled ramp will establish and promulgate passive duress procedures to alert coworkers and Protective Services personnel of duress situations.

## 4.0 AIRCRAFT & COMPONENTS AT NON-NASA OWNED FACILITIES (CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES & OVERSEAS)

Project/mission managers or aircraft commanders for support aircraft when identifying deployment locations must determine ownership and capability of available aircraft support facilities and obtain details regarding available organic security support at the deployed location. Reference NPR 1620.3 for physical security requirements.

### 4.1 Domestic cross-country flights

A. Code O flight scheduler will notify Protective Services of all flights of DFRC aircraft that remain overnight (RON) at domestic off station locations, prior to flight departure.

B. Elevated National Security Threat Levels (DoD or Homeland Security) may require that all NASA aircraft be secured at U. S. military or NASA facilities for RON operations. Protective Services will advise the Director for Flight Operations if this precaution is advised.

## 4.2 International Deployments:

A. Provide aircraft type, mission brief, and security details of the support facilities at the deployment location to Protective Services. If necessary, Protective Services will complete security assessment to determine the aircraft risk level per NPR 1620.3 and NPR 1620.2.

B. Protective Services will provide the project/mission managers and aircraft commanders the results of the risk analysis and direct any additional physical security measures above and beyond the requirements of NPR 1620.3.

C. For project aircraft, project/mission managers will include security measures for protection of the mission's resources in the operational readiness review (ORR). Protective Services will attend ORRs and comment on the proposed security plan and make any recommended changes as appropriate.

D. Security planning and coordination with Protective Services for support should commence at the earliest possible date.

## 4.3 NASA Aircraft

NASA aircraft with classified national security information (CNSI) components or equipment mounted internally or externally must be guarded at all times by U.S. citizens with a commensurate security clearance. Reference NPR 1600.3, NASA Personnel Security, 1600.2, NASA Classified National Security Information, and 1620.3, Physical Security Requirements for NASA Facilities and Property, for guidance. Any resource that has export restrictions such as items controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) or Export Administration Regulation (EAR) must be cleared with the Export Control Officer during mission planning or before. Reference NPR 2190.1B, NASA Export Control Program.

# 5.0 AIRCRAFT PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN AT INTERNATIONAL DEPLOYED LOCATIONS (EXCLUDING U. S. MILITARY AIRFIELDS)

The Director for Flight Operations, with the assistance of Protective Services, is responsible for developing and implementing a physical security plan for NASA DFRC assigned aircraft. All assigned aircrew and project personnel must be aware of the physical security plan and comply with the instructions therein.

Key elements of a security plan include:

A. Airfield Security Survey (Contact Protective Services for Advance Team Airfield Security Checklist)

B. Security Assessment (Contact Protective Services for Vulnerability Risk Analysis)

C. Divert Plan (Known divert locations)

D. Counter Intelligence (CI) / Counterterrorism (CT) Assessment (Contact CI)

E. Security Incidents and Reporting

F. Aircrew Checklists

Prior to conducting in country assessments for upcoming missions, project/ mission managers must coordinate with Protective Services for initial security and counterintelligence/counterterrorism briefs.

Obtain the Airfield Security Survey (checklist) from Protective Services during the initial security brief and complete the form at the deployed location. Upon return to DFRC, provide Protective Services with a completed Airfield Security Survey.

At a minimum, project/program managers must ensure physical security protective measures for Risk Level I are implemented at deployed locations.

Aircraft will be parked, whenever practical, at a government airfield or civilian airport with an active physical security program. If a deployed location has no security program and a crewmember cannot remain with the aircraft, the aircraft commander will advise aviation facility and local law enforcement authorities, as appropriate, of the aircraft location, identification, length of stay, and ways to contact crewmembers. (Note: if ITAR or CNSI is aboard the aircraft, a crewmember must remain with the aircraft at all times – reference NPR 2190.1B, NPRs 1600.2, and 1600.3.)

If there is no active security program at the facility, aircraft commanders at their discretion and based on any credible threat information, should consider having the aircraft inspected daily by a crewmember. The crewmember will check for any evidence of tampering, sabotage, placement of explosive devices, and loss or damage to aircraft or mission components.

When appropriate, accessible and easily removable components will be removed and stored in a location capable of being secured against theft, sabotage, or vandalism.

### 5.1 Divert Plan

Project/mission managers must ensure a physical security summary report for known divert locations is prepared and briefed as part of the security plan at the ORR.

### 5.2 Counter Intelligence / Counterterrorism (CI / CT)

Project/mission managers must contact the CI prior to deployment and obtain the latest CI/CT brief relative to the mission destination. Project/mission managers should consider the following for security plan development:

A. Foreign intelligence service (FIS) and terrorist threat levels.

B. Any FIS or terrorist intelligence indicating NASA equities may be targeted.

C. Terrorist threats against U.S. aircraft.

D. Any known FIS collection interest in the deployed NASA aircraft or technology.

E. Terrorist or FIS presence in relation to deployed location facilities.

F. Any known FIS or terrorist threats against NASA operations in the area of responsibility (AOR).

G. Activists in the deployed location.

## 6.0 SECURITY INCIDENTS & REPORTING

### 6.1 In The Event Of Any General Security Incident

A. Notify the senior Dryden representative or aircraft commander.

B. Advise the tower, fire department, local security force, and other appropriate host nation authorities of unauthorized or unlawful activity.

C. The senior Dryden representative or aircraft commander will secure/cordon the aircraft until incident termination. No one is allowed onboard the aircraft until the senior Dryden representative or aircraft commander has determined “all clear.”

D. The senior Dryden representative or aircraft commander will notify DRFC Protective Services.

### 6.2 Hijacking Incident Considerations

A. Attempt to determine intent of hijacker(s).

B. Comply with initial demands.

C. Negotiate patiently. Do not antagonize.

D. Avoid actions that might appear hostile.

E. Explain before adjusting controls.

F. Keep passengers calm. Prevent them from intervening.
G. Consider passing information to controlling authorities.
H. Expect local authorities to take control.
I. Follow local authorities' instruction; no independent acts.
J. Make the hijacker do his own thinking.
K. Ensure adequate supply of food, water, and sanitary supplies.
L. Transfer to ground power.
M. If needed, obtain air conditioning unit if possible.
N. Keep galley and aisles clean and orderly.
O. Look after passengers and crew health.

## 7.0 AIRCRAFT SECURITY CHECKLIST/FLIGHT OPERATIONS CHECKLIST

The Director for Flight Operations will develop aircraft security checklists and flight operations checklists for each aircraft type operated. The contents of this checklist are to be protected and limited to the aircrew implementing the checklist. Add to the aircraft security checklist those elements below that apply to a particular aircraft, mission, or location.

### 7.1 Aircraft Physical Security Considerations Checklist (Any Deployed Location)

A. Schedule 24-hour U.S. presence for aircraft with CNSI components. Reference NPR 1600.3

B. When practical, park in locked hangar. Ensure access control and key/badge accountability.

C. Aircraft door and access panels are locked, tamper taped, or sealed.

D. Aircraft access or engine start disabled as appropriate.

E. Engine blanks fitted.

F. Lock/seal tank and valves.

G. Employ auxiliary locks for throttle or tie-downs.

H. Ensure pilot or a crewmember is present during aircraft servicing.

I. Emergency power available.

J. Cockpit windows covered to prevent observation of avionics and other contents.

K. Check baggage compartments, cavities, and lavatories for unauthorized personnel or objects prior to every departure.

L. Ensure organic security exists with principled flight line security posture (positive access control, police/security patrols, fencing and lights).

M. Contingency plans available (coordinate with host nation).

N. Challenge suspicious individuals.

7.2 Flight Operations Considerations Checklist (International Deployed Locations—non-U.S. Military Airfield)

A. Upon arrival at destination, all crew members review aircraft security plan and conduct exercises as necessary.

B. Obtain local threat briefing and security posture by host personnel.

C. Obtain the aviation facility emergency grid map (identifies ramp areas, fence line, gates, automobile parking areas, hydrants, emergency shelters, and hazardous materials sites).

D. Ensure crew members display photo identification.

E. Limit publication of aircraft itinerary.

F. Establish security threat alerting procedures (duress codeword).

G. Obtain emergency contact numbers and challenge procedures from host nation and post on or in the vicinity of the aircraft.

H. Have available an accurate and accessible passenger manifest for all trip legs.

I. Ensure NASA personnel, authorized guests, and service personnel are identified in advance and approved by the aircraft commander, prior to boarding NASA aircraft and escort as required.

J. Inspect parts, equipment, baggage, and cargo before placing aboard aircraft and maintain positive control of luggage and/or aircraft cargo. Match luggage to specific passengers.

K. Challenge suspicious individuals.

L. Notify host nation authorities for unlawful acts.

# 8.0 RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

## 8.1 Authority Documents

| | |
|---|---|
| NPR 1600.1 | NASA Security Program Procedural Requirements |
| NPR 1600.2 | NASA Classified National Security Information |
| NPR 1600.3 | NASA Personnel Security |
| NPR 1620.2 | Physical Security Vulnerability Risk Assessments |
| NPR 1620.3 | Physical Security Requirements for NASA Facilities and Property |
| NPR 2190.1 | NASA Export Control Program |
| NPD 1371.5 | Coordination and Authorization of Access by Foreign Nationals and Foreign Representatives to NASA |

## 8.2 Referenced Documents

Safety Managment Systems (SMS) Protocol 15

## 8.3 Forms

NASA Form 1713, Physical Security Vulnerability Risk Analysis Worksheet

# 9.0 ACRONYMS & DEFINITIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| AOR | Area of Resposnibility |
| CI/CT | Counter Intelligence/ Counter Terrorism |
| CNSI | Classified National Security Information |
| CPS | Chief, Protective Services |
| DAOF | Dryden Aircraft Operations Facility |
| DFRC | Dryden Flight Research Center |
| FBO | Fixed Base Operator |
| FIS | Foreign Intelligence Service |
| FSM | Facility Security Manager |
| ID | Identification |
| ITAR | International Traffic and Arms Regulations |

| | |
|---|---|
| NASA | National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
| NPR | NASA Procedural Requirements |
| SMS | Safety Management Systems |
| UAS | Unmanned Aircraft Systems |
| UAV | Unmanned Arial Vehicles |

## Document History Log
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This page is for informational purposes and does not have to be retained with the document.

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- Section and description of changes.